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A

CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

INACTION IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS
By VED P.

NANDA*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation state is
an event of major significance for the people of the entire
Indian subcontinent. Its long-range effects are at present uncertain, but a likely result is a shift in the balance of power in
Asia.' Already India has begun to assert its role as a dominant
power in South Asia and a major middle power in the world
arena; and it is anticipated that the future triangular contest
among India, China, and Japan for the friendship and loyalty
of the Asian states will precipitate a readjustment of power in
Asia, particularly in the context of the global clash of U.S.Soviet interests.
For the international lawyer, the birth of Bangladesh and
the events which preceded it are of particular significance; this
for a variety of reasons: (1) India's intervention by the use of
force raises serious questions as to the viability of articles
2(4)2 and 2(7) 3 of the U.N. Charter; (2) the prolonged silence
on the part of the U.N. in the wake of gross, persistent, and
massive violations of human rights by the Pakistani armed
forces and their collaborators calls into question the adequacy
of the available international mechanisms to prevent such occurrences; and (3) the crisis underscores the need to reevaluate
the concepts of "humanitarian intervention" and "self-determination" in international law.
It is the purpose of this article to raise some preliminary
*Professor

of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,

University of Denver College of Law.
'See, e.g., D. MANKEKAR, PAKISTAN CUT TO SIZE (1972); Gupta, The Impact
of Bangla Desh, Economic & Political Weekly (Bombay), Jan. 1, 1972,
at 15. See also Wanavwala, The Indo-Soviet Treaty - The Sub-continent Reconstructed, 246 ROUND TABLE: THE COMMONWEALTH J. INT'L
AFFAIRS (London) 199 (1972); BANGLA DESH:

CRISIS & CONSEQUENCES

(A Deen Dayal Research Institute, New Delhi, publication 1972);
Narayanan, Towards a New Equilibrium in Asia, 7 ECONOMIC & POLrTICAL WEEKLY (Bombay) 219 (1972).
2 "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
3 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to interfere in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; and this principle
shall not prejudice the application of information measures under Chap-

ter VII." U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 7.
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questions on the U.N. inaction, and on articles 2(4) and 2(7)
of the U.N. Charter. Self-determination in noncolonial situations, which I have discussed elsewhere, 4 and the nature and
scope of humanitarian intervention in the light of the Bangladesh crisis, which I propose to study separately, will not be
discussed.
I. EvENTs PRECEDING THE CRISIS
The genesis of the Bangladesh crisis can be traced to the
partition of India in 1947 which created the state of Pakistan
out of two disparate parts, physically separated by a distance
of over 1,000 miles and otherwise divided by ethnic, linguistic,
and cultural differences.5 The only elements tending to bind
these parts were a common religion, Islam, and the hatred of
India. Neither of these proved to be sufficiently strong to ensure
lasting unity and by the late 1960's the economic and political
domination of East Pakistan by West Pakistan Panjabis had
6
resulted in serious political unrest in East Pakistan.
The events that led to the final break between East and
West Pakistan began with the Pakistani general elections of
December 1970, the first ever based on the adult franchise. The
Awami League party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won an
overwhelming victory, capturing 167 of 313 seats in the National
Assembly on a program of political and economic autonomy for
East Pakistan. 7 The election results were apparently unacceptable to the military-landlord-business-industrial clique in West
Pakistan, which undoubtedly faced with some alarm the prospects of being ruled by the Awami League party. The East
Pakistani demand for autonomy was perceived by the West
4 Nanda, Self-Determination in

International Law: The Tragic Tale of
Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan),
66 AM. J. INT'L 321 (1972).
5 See, e.g., Chowdhury, Bangladesh: Why it Happened, 48 INT'L AFF. 242
(1972); Michener, A Lament for Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 11, 43-46; Morris-Jones, Pakistan Post-Mortem and
the Roots of Bangladesh, 43 POL. Q. (London) 187 (1972). See also
Jackson, Birth of a Nation, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 18,1971, at
15, col. 1; Nanda, Bangla Desh: From Genocide Toward Statehood, NATION, Dec. 27, 1971, at 690; Tanner, Bangalis Pressing Their Cause in
Corridors of United Nations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1971, at 13, col. 1
(statement of Justice Chowdhury, who is now President of Bangladesh); Tanner, Swaran Singh Says India Seeks No Pakistani Land,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1971, at 16, col. 3 (statement of India's Foreign
Minister, Singh); N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1971, § 4, at 10, col. 1 (editorial);
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1971, at 47, col. 2 (excerpts from a lead editorial
in the London New Statesman).
6 Michener, supra note 5, at 44-46.
7 On the election results, see Ministry of External Affairs, Republic of
India, Bangla Desh Documents, cited in 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 550
(1971); Far Eastern Economic Rev., Jan. 9, 1971, at 19-21. The text of
the Awami League Manifesto is reprinted at 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
524 (1971).
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Pakistani ruling elite as a major threat. Its likely outcome was
seen to be the loss of a captive market for West Pakistani manufactured goods and the curtailment of the primary source of
such valuable raw materials as jute and tea as well as the bulk
8
of Pakistan's foreign exchange.
In early 1971, a breakdown in negotiations for the convening
of the National Assembly to draft a constitution intensified the
crisis and caused the simmering unrest in East Pakistan to surface in mass demonstrations against the Pakistani government.
This situation was exacerbated by Sheikh Mujib's call for noncooperation with the government. There ensued serious acts of
civil disobedience, including refusal to pay taxes and a total
strike in government offices and businesses. This was accompanied by a change in the East Bengali mood which began to
reflect a desire for complete independence as opposed to mere
autonomy.
Ultimately, on March 25, 1971, the Pakistani military struck
Dacca without warning and initiated a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan which continued with increasing intensity
until December 1971.10 Villages were burned; civilians were
indiscriminately killed; Hindus were sorted out and massacred
as were university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors,
Awami League leaders, and Bengali military and police officials. 1 The horror of these events prompted observers to accuse
the Pakistani armed forces and razakars, the local volunteer
militiamen who were collaborators of the Pakistani armed
forces in East Bengal, of committing selective genocide, pur12
portedly to deprive East Pakistan of Bengali leadership.
8 Hayward, Pakistan Feels Economic Impact From Loss of Bangladesh,

Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 22, 1972, at 14, col. 1.
9 Nanda, supra note 4, at 323 nn.12-13, 331 nn.74-77.
10 See notes 11-15 infra; Nanda, supra note 4, at 331-33. For accounts of

the alleged atrocities by the Pakistani army, see Hearings Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with the Refugees and
Escapees of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. I, at 95-226, pt. II, at 311-53, pt. III, at 431-81 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 35-50 (1971).
11 Michener, supra note 5, at 46-48; Schwarz, Bloody Baptism for Bangladesh, M.G. Weekly, Dec. 25, 1971, at 4, cols. 1, 3.
12 See Cousins, Genocide in East Pakistan, SATURDAY REVIEW, May 22, 1971,
at 20; sources cited in Nanda, supra note 4, at 332 nn.81-86; Shaplen,
A Reporter at Large: The Birth of Bangladesh -I, NEW YORKER, Feb.
12, 1972, at 40, 65, wherein the author quotes the resident editor of the
Indian Express (New Delhi) as describing in May 1971, the Pakistani
action as "a demographic war" designed to "destroy or drive out those
whom it considers immediately or prospectively undesirable." The first
thorough expcs6 was done by Mascarenhas, Pakistani correspondent of
the Sunday Times (London) issue of June 13, 1971, which is reprinted in
the Senate Hearings pt. I, at 120 with the accompanying editorial at 118.
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The 9-month wave of terror forced approximately 10 million people to flee from East Pakistan and take refuge in India. 13 This in turn put a severe strain on India-Pakistan relations and as a result, on December 3, 1971, full-scale war erupted
between the two nations.
The destruction and havoc wreaked by the 2-week conflict
which ensued were frightful: "Thirty million people dislocated
by the war. More than 1.5 million homes destroyed. Nine million refugees returning from India to rebuild their lives and
aomes. War damage drastically reducing rail traffic. Key rail
and road bridges destroyed. '14 According to the Swiss U.N.
Chief in Dacca, Toni Hagen, the destruction suffered by Bangladesh was greater than that suffered by Europe in World
War 11.15
II. THE U.N. AND THE BANGLADESH CRISIS
The role of the United Nations in the crisis was, at best,
that of a concerned but helpless observer. While it assumed part
of the burden of maintaining the millions of refugees pouring
into India,1" it lacked the willingness to take positive steps to
13

This the the reported number of refugees. Mehta, Letter From West Bengal, NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 1971, at 166; Schanberg, Bengalis' Land a Vast
Cemetery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 1, col. 5, 7; Tanner, Swaran Singh
Says India Seeks No Pakistani Land, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1971, at 16,
col. 3, 6 (statement of India's Defense Minister Singh); Christian
Science Monitor, Dec. 18, 1971, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1971, at
46, col. 1, 2 (editorial); id. at 47, col. 1 (statement by John Lewis, former
U.S. AID director of India, 1964-69). For a Reuter report on the return
of all the refugees to Bangladesh, see Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 28,
1972, at 19, col. 2. For a succinct account, see CRSIS IN SOUTH ASIA- A
REPORT BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY TO THE SUBCOlvIMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES (Nov. 1,

1971).
Winder, Bangladesh: a Race for Solutions, Christian Science Monitor,
Apr. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 2; see also Nanda, Bangladesh Economy in Ruin,
Rocky Mtn. News (Global Section), Oct. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
15 TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at 30. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman estimated that the
Pakistanis may have killed three million Bengalis. Schanberg, supra
note 13, col. 7; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1972, at 3, col. 1; TIME, Feb. 28,
1972, at 30. The police chief in Dacca is reported to have described the
"slaughter of East Pakistan" in these words: "The whole country is a
mass grave. Who knows how many millions have been killed?" N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1971 at 14, col. 1. A New York Times correspondent reported a month after the surrender that he found "on a recent tour of
the countryside, that almost every town in East Pakistan had one or
more of these graveyards, where the Pakistanis killed hundreds of
thousands of Bengalis, apparently often on a daily basis, throughout
their 9 months of military occupation." Schanberg, supra note 13, col.
5. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 2; Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 28, 1972 at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6; N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1971, at 2, col. 5; TrmE, Oct. 25, 1971, at 37. In Khulna
alone, the number of people killed at one execution site is estimated at
between 10,000 and 15,000. Motherland (New Delhi), Jan. 30, 1972, at 8,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
various initiatives, see 8
16For an account of the Secretary-General's
U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 6) at 49-50 (June 1971); id. (No. 8) at
56-59, 67-68 (Aug.-Sept. 1971). For discussion and action by various
U.N. organs, see id. (No. 6) at 106 (June 1971); id. (No. 8) at 72 (Aug.Sept. 1971); id. (No. 9) at 87 (Oct. 1971); id. (No. 10) at 206 (Nov.
1971); id. (No. 11) at 124-26 (Dec. 1971). [The U.N. MONTHLY CHRONI14
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prevent the tragic happenings that were gradually but surely
pushing India and Pakistan to a head-on collision.
Not until full-scale war between India and Pakistan had
erupted did the Security Council and the General Assembly see
fit to discuss the matter. The Council began its deliberations on
December 4, 1971,17 but since the Soviet veto blocked any action,' 8 the Council referred the question to the General Assemly. 19 The General Assembly then proceeded to discuss the
situation 20 and ultimately adopted a resolution calling for an
immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all troops. 2 1 Howver, India considered these recommendations to be unrelated
22
to the cause of the crisis, unrealistic, and hence, unacceptable.
It may be an exaggeration to charge the U.N. members
with blindness, callous indifference, or even cowardice in ignoring the crisis or dismissing it as not worthy of attention,
for perhaps the inaction could be attributed to the realization
on the part of a majority of nation states that a discussion at
the United Nations would not resolve the conflict but might
even exacerbate it. Or perhaps the inaction was caused by the
concern that a U.N. intervention in the allegedly domestic
affairs of Pakistan might create an unhealthy precedent, or
perhaps that even if the United Nations intervened, it might
not be effective. 23 In any event, mishandling by the U.N. of
the entire situation is a matter of such serious concern that it
deserves careful examination in order to pfevent similar occurrences in the future.
A. Discussion in the Human Rights Organs of the United
Nations
One U.N. organ which did consider the political and human
rights aspects of the crisis was the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. The Subcommission was
will be cited frequently throughout the paper due to the delay in
publicaticn of official U.N. documents and because of its relative ease
of availability]. For reports by the Secretary-General on the U.N.
"effort for the relief of the people of Bangladesh" as of the end of May
1972, see U.N. Doc. A/8662 and add. 1 & 2; U.N. Doc. S/10539 and add.
1 & 2 (1972).
For a summary account of the Council deliberations, see 9 U.N. MONTHLY
CLE

17

CHRONICLE

(No. 1) at 3-25 (Jan. 1972).

For the Soviet veto, see id. at 13, 20.
19 S.C. Res. 303 (1971). The text is contained in id. at 25.
20 For a summary account of the Assembly discussion, see id. at 89-91.
For the text of the resolution,
21 G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (Dec. 7, 1971).
see id. at 91.
22 See the Indian delegate's statement in id. at 28-29.
23 1 am grateful to my colleague, William Beaney, for his suggestion that I
explicitly identify the possible reasons for the U.N. inaction.
18
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prompted to discuss the situation at the initiative of 22 international non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council.24 Addressing the Subcommission on behalf of these organizations, 25 John Salzberg,
a representative of the International Commission of Jurists,
made a strong plea that the Subcommission exercise its full
authority granted it under resolution 8(XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights and under Economic and Social Council resolution 1235(XLII) 2, He asked the Subcommission either
to set up a committee of inquiry to investigate the various reports of alleged violations of human rights in East Pakistan
or to recommend to the Commission on Human Rights that it
27
establish such an investigatory body.
The authority granted under resolution 8(XXIII) is that
of referring to the Commission any situation which the Subcommission "has reasonable cause to believe reveals a consistent pattern of violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms," and of preparing a report "containing information
on violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms from
all available sources. ' 2 The Economic and Social Council in
resolution 1235(XLII) has not only put its stamp of approval
on the Commission's action in so authorizing the Subcommission, but has asked the Commission "to make a thorough study
of situations revealing a consistent pattern of violations of human rights" and to report to the ECOSOC with its recommenda29
tions on such situations.
The summary records of the Subcommission show that
except for the Indian observer3 1' and the Pakistani representative on the Subcommission,"1 only three other members of the
Subcommission participated in the discussion, 3 one of whom
opposed the discussion on the ground that the matter fell within
the purview of article 2(7)32 of the U.N. Charter. Although the

25

U.N. ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 24th Sess.,
Agenda Item No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/NGO.46 (July 23, 1971).
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/SR.625-35, at 75 (1971).

26

Id. at 76.

27

Id. at 78.

24

2s Report on the 23d Sess., Comm'n on Human Rights, 42 U.N. ECOSOC,

Supp. 6, at 131 (1967).
2942 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 17 (1967). The text of the resolution is
conveniently contained in 1967 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at 512.
30
For his remarks, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/SR. 625-35, at 145 (1971).
31 For his remarks, see id. at 139.
'2 For their remarks, see id. at 74-75, 146-47.
33 Id. at 74.

1972
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other two participants expressed concern at the situation,3 4
only one member addressed himself to the role of the Subcommission.35 The Subcommission "had very properly spent many
days discussing the question of the protection of the rights of
individuals," 36 he said, but to him it seemed that "when faced
with a situation affecting tens of thousands of persons, members
were inclined to suppress their feelings and consciences. ' '37 The
Subcommission "should not remain silent, ''38 he added. But the
Subcommission did remain silent.
B.

Discussion in Other U.N. Organs

In July 1971, the Economic and Social Council dealt with
the humanitarian aspects of the problem, focusing on the U.N.
relief operations. 39 Four months later, in November, the Third
Committee of the General Assembly discussed the accomplishments of the U.N. East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO)
and the problems it faced. 40 The representative of New Zealand,
however, called the Committee's attention to the political aspects of the problem. "If the flow of refugees was to be stopped
and war avoided," it was essential, he said, that there should
be negotiations between the government of Pakistan and the
elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan.4 1 A draft
resolution submitted in the Third Committee by New Zealand
and the Netherlands also touched upon the political aspects of
the question, insofar as it referred to the need for restoring
the "climate of confidence" on the part of Pakistan so as to
promote voluntary repatriation of refugees. 42 However, the resolution finally adopted by the General Assembly on December
6, 1971, contained only an innocuous reference to the need for
"a favorable climate which all persons of goodwill should work
to bring about . . . 43 It should be noted that at the time the
General Assembly was adopting this resolution, a full-scale war
was already in its fourth day.
Id. at 139.
35 Id. at 74-75.
36 Id. at 74.
37 Id. at 74-75.
38 Id. at 75.
39 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 8) at 72 (Aug.-Sept. 1971).
34

40

For a summary report, see 8 U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

(No. 11) at 124-

26 (Dec. 1971).
41 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1877 (Nov. 19, 1971).
42 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L. 1885 (Nov. 18, 1971). The advisability of this reference was questioned by the representative of Somalia because of its

controversial nature.
43U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1879 (Nov. 22, 1971).
(Dec. 6, 1971).

G.A. Res. 2790 (XXVI)
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The Security Council and the General Assembly Debates
The discussions in the Security Council 44 and the General
Assembly 45 show that most member states were primarily concerned with the restoration of the status quo- an immediate
cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of forces.
Intervention, particularly military intervention across international boundaries, was unacceptable to a vast majority
of the U.N. members for fear that it might set an unhealthy
precedent. The members invoked concepts of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national independence in the hope that
it might somehow stop the fighting. The Soviet Union 46 and
Poland 47 were the only two Council members which, along
with India, 48 repeatedly stressed the need for looking at the
"root cause" of the problem and seeking a political solution to
the crisis. To call for a cease-fire without correlating it with
the attainment of a political settlement in East Pakistan was
considered inadequate and unrealistic.
To recount briefly, the Council discussed the situation on
December 4, 5, and 6. On the first day of discussion, Pakistan
accused India of unprovoked "aggression, '49 described the East
Pakistan crisis prior to December 3 as internal and therefore
"outside the Security Council's concern" 50 and asserted that it
was "for the Security Council to find the means to make India
desist from its war of aggression. Only means devised by the
Security Council, consistent with Pakistan's independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and with the principle of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Member States,
would command Pakistan's support and co-operation." 51
India replied that in spite of the humanitarian efforts by
the U.N., killings had continued in East Pakistan and warned
the Council that it "would not be a party to any solution that
would mean continuation of the oppression of the East Pakistan
people. '52 The representatives of the U.S., 53 Italy, 54 Somalia, 55
44 9

U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

45 Id. at 89-91.
46 Id. at 11-12, 38.
47 Id. at 12.
48 Id. at 25, 28-29.
49 Id. at 5-6.
50
Id. at 7.

51 Id. at 8.
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 9-10.
54 Id. at 10.

55Id.

(No. 1) at 3-25 (Jan. 1972).
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France,56 Japan,5 7 China,58 Syrian Arab Republic,5 Belgium, 60
Burundi,61 Argentina, 62 the United Kingdom,6 3 and Sierra
Leone6 4 called for an immediate cease-fire, while the representatives of the Soviet Union65 and Poland 6 urged the Council
to seek a political settlement, taking into account the wishes
of the East Pakistanis. A draft resolution introduced by the
67
United States was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
Charges and countercharges were repeated on December 5,
with Pakistan 8 and China 9 forcefully invoking article 2(7) to
claim that the Council should demand an end to India's armed
intervention, while the Soviet Union accused China of trying
"to divert attention from the main cause of the conflict in the
Hindustan Peninsula, which was the monstrous and bloody
repression of East Pakistan. '' 70 Another resolution calling for a
cease-fire was vetoed by the Soviet Union. 71 Similar arguments
were again repeated on December 6 when the Indian representative urged the Council to "consider some realities. '' 72 He
said: "Refugees were a reality. Genocide and oppression were
a reality. The extinction of all civil rights was a reality. Provocation and aggression of various kinds by Pakistan from March
25 onwards were a reality. Bangladesh itself was a reality, as
was its recognition by India. The Council was nowhere near
' 7'
reality. 8
Since the Council was paralyzed and there were apparently
no prospects for a consensus among the major powers, the
Council eventually adopted a resolution, 74 pursuant to which
it decided to refer the question to the General Assembly, as
provided for in General Assembly resolution 377 A(V) of November 3, 1950.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 10-11.
58 Id. at 11.
59 Id.

6o Id.at 12.
61 Id.
62

Id.

63 Id.
64

Id. at 13.

65 Id. at 11-12.

66 Id. at 12.
67 Id. at 13.
68 Id. at 17.
69 Id. at 19.
70

Id. at 15.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 25.
73 Id.
74 S.C. Res. 303 (1971).

71
72

The text is contained in id.
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The Assembly met twice on December 775 and adopted
a resolution by a vote of 104 in favor, to 11 against, with 10
abstentions, which called for an immediate cease-fire and a
mutual troop withdrawal by India and Pakistan. 76 The overwhelming majority in favor of the resolution demonstrated
the concern of the members for territorial integrity and article
2(7). Pakistan explained its interpretation of the resolution to
mean that "no attempt would be made to disrupt the national
unity of Pakistan, and that any attempts by the General Assembly to intervene in the situation would be within the prin77
ciple of the territorial integrity of Pakistan."
Since India did not comply with the Assembly recommendations, the Council was again called into session at the
request of the United States. The Council met seven times between December 12 and 21;78 the Soviet Union vetoed one more
resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and troop withdrawal; 79 and finally the Council adopted a resolution on December 21, by which it demanded that a durable cease-fire and
cessation of all hostilities on the India-Pakistan sub-continent
be strictly observed until troop withdrawals had taken place. 80
Ironically, India had already declared a cease-fire unilaterally
on December 17 after the surrender of the Pakistani armed
forces. 8'
But for the dramatic walkout of the Pakistani delegate from
the Council meeting on December 15,82 and the heated exchanges between the delegates of India and Pakistan,8 3 this
round of Council meetings is of significance only in its rehash
of the earlier arguments. However, as the eventual surrender
of the Pakistani army became imminent, the tone of the Council debates shifted from an unrelenting emphasis on an immediate cease-fire to a fresh concern for a political settlement.
For instance, on the evening of December 15, the Soviet delegate said that "many delegations had told him personally that
the Soviet approach to the solution of the problem regarding
the interrelationship between cessation of hostilities and a poliFor a summary report, see id. at 89-91.
76 G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (1971). The text is contained id. at 91.
75

77 Id.
78 For a summary report, see id. at 26-45.
79 For the text of the draft resolution, see id. at 28. For voting on the
resolution, see id. at 34.
80 S.C. Res. 307 (1971). For the text, see id. at 45-46.
81 N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1971, at 16, col. 5 (Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in the Parliament of India on the truce and surrender).
82 9 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 1) at 37 (Jan. 1972).
83 Id. at 28-31.
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tical settlement, was perfectly correct. 8 4 The delegate from
Ceylon considered "a political settlement in East Pakistan to be
central to any solution, and negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the acknowledged leaders of the people
of East Pakistan to be the only effective and legitimate means
of achieving it."' 5
D.

The Role of the Secretary-General in the Crisis
To his credit, the Secretary-General did take the initiative
to bring the gravity of the situation to the attention of the
Security Council. 6 However, he did not pursue the matter any
further. When the Council deemed fit not to meet formally to
discuss the issue, he seems to have chosen the course of least
resistance. Henceforth, his efforts were focused on the humanitarian aspects,8 7 followed in October 1971 by the offer of his
good offices to the governments of India and Pakistan. s8 He
never insisted that a Security Council meeting be called to
discuss a situation which, in his words, had by July 1971 become a potential threat to international peace and security and
had the potential of adversely affecting the United Nations effectiveness "for international co-operation and action."'
He
had clearly perceived the danger, for in his introduction to the
Annual Report of the Secretary-General, issued on September
19, he said: "In a disaster of such vast proportions, the international community has a clear obligation to help the Governments and peoples concerned in every possible way. But, as I
have indicated, the basic problem can be solved only if a political solution based on reconciliation and the respect of humanitarian principles is achieved." 9 However, he did not use the
authority granted him under article 99 to bring the matter
before the Security Council for discussion, 91 nor did he ask the
Id. at 38.
Id.
86 In a memorandum to the President of the Security Council. U.N. Doc.
S/10410 (July 20, 1971). The text is also contained in 8 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE (No. 8) at 51-59 (Aug.-Sept. 1971).
87 See, e.g., the Secretary-General's statement of August 2, 1971, contained
in 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 8) at 56-57 (Aug.-Sept. 1971); For
a summary report of his activities in this regard, see id. (No. 9) at 13032 (Oct. 1971); id. (No. 10) at 95-96 (Nov. 1971); id. (No. 11) at 116-18
(Dec. 1971).
88 The text of his letters is contained in id. (No. 10) at 97-98 (Nov. 1971).
89The reference is contained in the Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, id. (No. 9) at 92, 132
(Oct. 1971).
90 Id. at 132.
91 "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Coun84
85
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General Assembly to meet in an emergency session since the
Council was unwilling to meet.
Perhaps the Secretary-General, in refusing to act, was concerned with futility of his efforts. Perhaps he was discouraged
because his prior attempts to bring about a settlement in Vietnam had come to naught. Perhaps he did not want to strain
the U.N. machinery, which clearly has only limited competence.
But he failed to balance all these inadequacies against the possible outcome of the U.N. silence, for at least there was the
possibility that formal discussions at the U.N. and the world
public opinion generated by such discussions might have put
pressure on the Pakistani regime so as to compel the latter to
seek a political settlement of the crisis, or at least force it to
put a stop to the ruthless suppression by its army and collaborators in East Pakistan.
In any event, article 2(7) was certainly on the SecretaryGeneral's mind, for in the Introduction to the Annual Report,
he said that in his exchanges with the governments of India
and Pakistan, he had been "acutely aware of the dual responsibility of the United Nations, including the Secretary-General,
under the Charter both to observe the provision of Article 2,
paragraph 7, and to work, within the framework of international economic and social co-operation, to help promote and
ensure human well-being and humanitarian principles. '92 It is
submitted that this construction of article 2(7), in the light
of the circumstances, is at best exceedingly narrow, and seems
unwarranted by the past practices of the United Nations in
9 3
dealing with cases of massive violations of human rights.

III.

APPRAISAL AND

RECOMMENDATION

In the Council debate of December 12, the Indian delegate
succinctly summed up the U.N. dilemma, when he said:
It was not India which declared or started war; it was not India
which was responsible for creating the conditions that led to the
present unfortunate conflict; it was not India which deliberately
and systematically refused to meet the aspirations of the 75 million people inhabiting the country, once part of Pakistan; it was
not India which perpetuated the repression, genocide and brutality which provided the springboard for the freedom movement
of Bangla Desh, which led to the decision of the people of that
region to create a free and independent nation; it was not India
which forsook the long period of nine months during which a
reasonable political settlement could have been evolved with the
leaders and people of Bangla Desh.
92

8 U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

(No. 9) at 130 (Oct. 1971).

93 The number of resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and
the Security Council on South Africa and Rhodesia is an indicator of the
interpretation of article 2(7) by the U.N. bodies in situations involving
massive and persistent violation of human rights.
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The United Nations had been unable to deal with the root cause
of the problem in East Bengal. Informal consultations in the
Security Council in July and August indicated that the international community could not, due to limitations born of its commitments to the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, act in the matter. In the face of a direct violation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter by Pakistan, the Security Council and the United Nations
should have found themselves in a position to intervene and persuade Pakistan to return to reason. That did not happen. While
developments proceeded on their inexorable course towards the
present tragedy, the United Nations continued to be inhibited by
94
considerations of domestic jurisdiction.
The United Nations failed to prevent the crisis. It failed
to deter the Pakistani regime from using excssive force in East
Pakistan. It failed to stop the war. Above all, it failed even
to attempt to persuade or coerce the parties to arrive at a political settlement. The war is over. A new state was born with
the use of force and in technical violation of article 2 (4), for
notwithstanding India's claim that it went to war only in selfdefense and only after the Pakistani planes had strafed several
Indian cities, 95 and Pakistan had launched "full-scale war,"9 )
the fact remains that in late November 1971, the India-Pakistan
confrontation seemed almost inevitable.9 ' And it is not too farfetched to suggest that in all likelihood India would have invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to send its
armed forces into East Pakistan to help the rebel forces even
if it could not justify its action on grounds of self-defense.
There are three major questions: (1) Is the emphasis put
on article 2(7) by the Secretary-General and the U.N. members during the duration of the crisis realistic and functional
in a situation such as Bangladesh? (2) Are the expectations as
to the viability of article 2 (4) changed to the point that it is
really dead, as Professor Thomas Franck suggested in 1970?98
(3) Looking toward the future, what should the United Nations
have done to avert the eventual crisis and what action should
be taken to prevent such tragic occurrences in the future?
Without attempting a thorough discussion of articles 2(7)
and 2(4) in the context of the Bangladesh crisis, which I pro-

U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 1) at 29 (Jan. 1972).
95 Prime Minister Gandhi's statement reported in the Motherland (New
Delhi), Dec. 5, 1971, at 2, col. 1.
96 Prime Minister Gandhi's statement reported in N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1971,
at 10, col. 5.
97 See, e.g., Mohr, India and Pakistan Step up Preparationsfor Full War New Units Are Formed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
98
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 Am.J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
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pose to study in collaboration with two of my colleagues, 99
some tentative conclusions are offered here. Article 2(7) was
erroneously construed to prohibit intervention in the domestic
affairs of Pakistan, for at least three reasons: (1) the situation
as a potential threat to international peace and security had
ceased to be a domestic affair, (2) the presence of 10 million
refugees on India's soilOO with thousands fleeing from the Pakistani army's wrath each day, with its impact on India's economic and political structure, had internationalized the situation
vis-A-vis India, and (3) in view of the massive and persistent
violations of human rights, 10 1 the situation could no longer be
deemed to be a domestic one.
Article 2(4) may not be dead as Professor Louis Henkin
has asserted in his response to Professor Franck, 102 but the fact
remains that, for the following reasons, the Bangladesh crisis
has seriously shaken it: (1) notwithstanding the technical violation of article 2(4) by India in hastening the birth of Bangladesh, the latter was recognized within 4 months of its establishment by over 50 countries, 01 3 (2) India was not condemned,
nor even censored by any U.N. organ, for its use of force, and
(3) despite the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly
for an immediate cease-fire, member nations seemed reconciled
to India's use of force.
With respect to recommendations, it has been previously
mentioned that the Security Council should have discussed the
situation because of its gravity and potential threat. In the face
of inaction by the Security Council, the Secretary-General should
have invoked his authority under article 99 to ventilate the
situation in a U.N. forum.
The U.N. human rights machinery should have been active.
Specifically, the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities should have studied
the situation. It has been authorized to do so in those situations
which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights
99 Forthcoming law review article: Nanda, Cox & Neeleman, Humanitarian

Intervention, articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter and the Bangladesh Crisis.
100 See sources cited note 11 supra.
101 See sources cited notes 8-10, 12-13 supra.
102 Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
103 The United States recognized Bangladesh on April 4, 1972 (Welles,
Bangladesh Gets U.S. Recognition, Promise of Help, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1972, at 1, col. 5); it was the 55th country to recognize the new nation.
ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 1972, at 47, col. 3.
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based upon the available information to the Subcommission;-0 1
05
the Subcommission did have such information available to it.'
Now that the Subcommission is authorized initially to review communications sent by individuals and groups alleging
the violations of human rights, pursuant to procedures established by the ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII) May 27, 1970,106
the Subcommission has a special responsibility in this regard.
Perhaps the Commission on Human Rights should be authorized to meet in emergency sessions to discuss situations
which demand urgent and immediate attention because of "the
imminent threat or willful destruction of human life on a massive scale," a suggestion recently made by the International
Commission of Jurists." ' Perhaps the office of the proposed
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights should be authorized to undertake some initial investigation and recommend
measures for the Commission on Human Rights, once the office
is established. 0 8
The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, '0 9 which is in force and under
which the Committee on Racial Discrimination has been established, should have been invoked. Pakistan is a party to the
Convention and a special session of the Committee should have
been called.
The interdependence between the massive violation of human rights and international peace and security needs no further proof or evidence for these measures to be urgently undertaken and implemented in any future crisis involving such
violations.

of the
Commission on Human Rights. For the text of the resolution, see supra
note 28.
105 See p. 58 & note 24 supra.
10648 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1A, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
107 International Commission of Jurists Calls Upon Human Rights Commismission to Consider Implications of Human Rights Violations in East
Pakistan/Bangladesh, International Commission of Jurists Press Release
at 3(Apr. 5, 1972).
108 On the latest developments pertaining to the establishment of the Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, see G.A. Res. 2841
(XXVI) of Dec. 18, 1971.
109Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) (1966) in
December 1965. The text is conveniently contained in 60 Am. J. INT'L L.
650 (1966).
104 Pursuant to the authority granted under resolution 8 (XXIII)

